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T
he subtitle of this new book by University of 
Maryland economist Carmen Reinhart and 
Harvard University economist Kenneth Rogoff
gives the reader the best hint to the content inside. 
The heart of the book consists of a wealth of new data 
and analysis — much of which appears in a nearly 
100-page appendix — on public indebtedness, currency
crises, and financial meltdowns over the past eight cen-
turies. The scope of the data — much of which have never
been collected before — is impressive and the book stands 
as a testament to the scholarship of its authors. Such a
treasure trove should not go unnoticed by economic 
historians. 
The broader theme of the book is indicated by the main
title. In their tour of the data, the authors highlight empiri-
cal regularities that tend to correlate with the onset of
financial crises. Most of the book deals with the levels of
government indebtedness that predate financial crises. 
The run-up in sovereign debt (particularly “external debt”
issued to bondholders who reside outside the country) has
often presaged defaults of one form or another by the gov-
ernment. This is seen more frequently in developing
economies that tend to be more affected by swings in export
prices and international financial conditions.
Yet, while developing nations can fall into the trap 
of serial default on bond debt, all nations, including devel-
oped economies, have at one time or another indulged in
another, less severe, form of default: the inflation of the
nation’s currency. Reinhart and Rogoff rightly spend some
time seeking to counter the notion, all too common in 
conventional discussions of the topic in the media, that 
currency debasement is a distinctly different creature than
debt default. Instead, the authors suggest that inflation is
akin to defaulting on a bond or restructuring a debt because 
the outcome is the same: The government forces the bond-
holder or currency holder to accept a payment lower in real
terms than the original value of the debt. Reinhart and
Rogoff call it “default through debasement” and note that if
“serial default is the norm for a country passing through the
emerging market state of development, the tendency to
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lapse into periods of high and extremely high inflation is an
even more striking common denominator.” 
The other empirical regularity they encounter as a pre-
cursor to financial crises is a run-up in asset prices —
particularly housing prices — above a long-term trend.
More often than not, the authors argue, borrowing fuels the
asset price bubble. The bursting of the bubble then tends to
precipitate a banking crisis that drags down lending institu-
tions. In addition, recessions that accompany banking
crises tend to be deeper and harder to recover from than
other recessions.
The authors close, however, with a chapter that perhaps
inadvertently points out the principal shortcoming of 
the book itself. Once they have firmly established how
often leverage and asset price appreciations precede crises,
they go one step further to suggest that the regularities 
may be a basis for a real time “early warning system” for 
policymakers. So, for instance, since housing prices are at
the top of their list of “reliable indicators” of an impending
banking crisis, real-time collection of housing price data
might help regulators anticipate potential crisis scenarios.
Yet the authors don’t weave a robust narrative to suggest
how the variables interact. Although excessive leverage, a
capital windfall from abroad, and faster-than-usual housing
price appreciation do tend to correlate with financial crises,
determining which variable might potentially burst the
bubble is much harder. And, contrary to the spirit of the
book’s title, it’s plausible that different crises can be precip-
itated by all three aspects occurring in various sequences. 
The authors do acknowledge that the metrics identified
by their analysis will not provide “an obvious indication” of an
impending crisis. But any early warning system that is built on
a theory-free framework is bound to be problematic.
It’s also important to acknowledge that the empirical
regularities don’t occur in a policy vacuum. Institutions
matter, and the embedded rules of financial markets and 
the regulations that govern financial firms and depository
institutions play a role in economic outcomes. The case for
an early warning system for policymakers is weakened by
this lack of analysis — and, in the end, a sober analysis of
how regulatory institutions work and the limitations on
what government can effectively do might even topple the
case for codifying these early warning metrics. Foremost
among the concerns may be the notion that any governing
body given power to act on threats to systemic stability may
actually encourage the type of behavior it was designed to
discourage. 
Despite such caveats, Reinhart and Rogoff have written
a very valuable book, one that can be read profitably by a lay
audience, policymakers, and academic economists alike. RF